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Abstract
Despite efforts to ensure workplace safety and health, injuries and fatalities related to trenching 
and excavation remain alarmingly high in the construction industry. Because properly installed 
trenching protective systems can potentially reduce the significant number of trenching fatalities, 
there is clearly a need to identify the barriers to the use of these systems and to develop strategies 
to ensure these systems are utilized consistently. The current study reports on the results of focus 
groups with construction workers and safety management personnel to better understand these 
barriers and to identify solutions. The results suggest several factors, from poor planning to 
pressures from experienced workers and supervisors, which present barriers to safe trenching 
practices. Based on the results, it is recommended that safety trainings incorporate unique 
messages for new workers, experienced workers and management in an effort to motivate each 
group to work safely as well as provide them with solutions to overcome the identified barriers.
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Introduction
Despite efforts in workforce training, Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) regulations, and effective engineering controls, injuries and fatalities related to 
trenching and excavation remain alarmingly high in the construction industry. As a whole, 
the construction industry is considered high risk. Although construction workers comprise 
about seven percent of the US workforce, they accounted for almost 19% of the 4,340 work-
related deaths in 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, [BLS], 2009). Even by construction 
standards, trenching and excavation work is extremely dangerous. The BLS Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries data-set showed 159 fatalities resulting from trenching and excavation 
between 2003 and 2005 (Center for Construction Research and Training [CPWR], 2007).
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Many of the documented fatalities related to trenching and excavation were likely 
preventable. The most common cause (71%) of trench related fatalities are cave-ins and side 
wall collapses (CPWR, 2007). Properly installed trench wall protective systems, such as 
shielding, sloping and shoring, help protect workers from fatal accidents related to cave-ins 
and sidewall collapses but these systems do not appear to be used consistently. Because 
properly installed protective systems can potentially reduce trenching fatalities, there is a 
need to identify the barriers to their use and to develop strategies to ensure these systems are 
always utilized. The current study addresses this need by taking a qualitative approach and 
multiple sources to better understand the current trenching practices and to identify barriers 
to safety behaviors.
Determinants of Safety Performance
Understanding why workers behave the way they do is not a straightforward topic but there 
are recognized factors that play a role in workers’ behavior. Neal and Griffin’s (2004) safety 
performance framework provides a useful model to understand determinants of safety 
performance and safety outcomes. This framework suggests that safety knowledge and 
motivation are directly related to safety performance (e.g., working safely). Safety 
performance is hypothesized to be directly related to safety outcomes (e.g., working safely is 
likely to result in fewer injuries). The model also suggests that safety knowledge and 
motivation are predicted by characteristics of the individual (e.g., safety attitudes) and 
characteristics of the work environment (e.g., characteristics of the construction industry and 
safety climate).
Neal and Griffin’s (2004) model is utilized for the current study of unsafe trenching 
practices since the model points to possible factors that could help explain why workers do 
not engage in proper safety behaviors. Neal and Griffin’s suggestion that safety knowledge 
and motivation directly influence safety performance has been empirically supported (e.g., 
Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009). Therefore, possible barriers to safe trenching 
and excavations include lack of knowledge of proper safe practices or lack of motivation to 
engage in these behaviors. The model also points to the need to extend beyond knowledge 
and motivation since both are influenced by factors related to the individual worker as well 
as the work environment. In the following sections, individual antecedents and then work 
environment antecedents to safety performance will be addressed in detail.
Individual Antecedents of Safety Performance
As stated above, various characteristics of the individual worker are suggested to influence 
safety performance (Neal & Griffin, 2004). That is, workers possess various attitudes, 
experiences, and dispositions, which all influence the extent to which they work safely. 
Individuals hold beliefs and feelings towards safety, which are referred to as safety attitudes. 
Personal characteristics are proposed to influence safety performance through safety 
knowledge and motivation. For example, workers who hold poor safety attitudes are 
probably not going to go through the effort to learn the proper ways to work safely or be 
motivated to work in a safe manner, and are therefore, more likely to work unsafely.
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Researchers have found some support for the influence of personal characteristics on safety 
performance. Christian and colleagues (2009) found that safety performance was positively 
related to both locus of control and safety attitudes and negatively related to propensity for 
risk taking, although none of these relationships were strong. Another study found that 
individuals who do not value the importance of safety behaviors, feel pressured not to 
engage in safe behaviors, or do not feel like they have control over their own safe behaviors 
are not likely to engage in safe behaviors (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010). The above findings 
suggest that in addition to lack of knowledge and motivation, individual characteristics of 
trench workers could provide some explanation for why workers are not engaging in proper 
trenching-safety behaviors.
Work Environment Antecedents of Safety Performance
Based on Neal and Griffin’s (2004) work, one needs to extend beyond individual 
characteristics when attempting to understand lack of engagement in safety behavior since 
aspects of the work environment may also play a role in safety performance. When 
considering workplace safety, it is important to examine the characteristics of the industry 
(Ringen, Englund, Welch, Weeks, & Seegal, 1995; Ringen, Seegal, & Englund, 1995) as 
well as organizational factors (Neal & Griffin). Growing recognition of the relationships 
between industry characteristics, organizational factors and workplace safety is evidenced 
by its inclusion as a strategic goal in the National Occupational Research Agenda for 
Construction (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], 2008).
There are several characteristics specific to the construction industry that place workers’ 
safety and health at risk (Ringen, Seegal et al., 1995). Health and safety within the 
construction industry is complex since the work environment is constantly changing 
(Ringen, Englund et al., 1995). Construction projects usually involve multiple employers 
(e.g., a general contractor and multiple subcontractors) who are all involved with different 
tasks (e.g., electrical wiring and roof installation) and responsible for hiring and training 
their own workers. Because of the complexity of the organization of work, well-coordinated 
safety programs are difficult to implement. Common practices in the construction industry 
such as the competitive bidding process and production-based bonuses provide powerful 
immediate financial incentives for companies to take shortcuts, some of which could lead to 
unsafe behavior (NIOSH, 2008). Workers also face financial pressure resulting from 
common characteristics and practices in the construction industry. Construction work tends 
to be temporary, since the work is project based and arbitrary dismissal is common. This 
structural insecurity can result in workers prioritizing production over safety as a way to 
prove that they are valuable employees and thereby increasing their chances to remain on 
the job and be hired for the next project (Paap, 2006). Additionally, many construction 
workers operate as self-employed subcontractors, thus removing the responsibility for 
providing workplace safety from the project management.
All of the above characteristics are important to consider since they can influence safety 
performance. Due to the constant changing of work sites and lack of coordinated safety 
programs, workers might not know how to work safely at times. The competitive nature of 
projects and the pressure to work quickly compared to correctly likely motivates workers to 
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work unsafely. These pressures can be influenced by macroeconomic conditions and are apt 
to be aggravated by increased competition in the bidding and hiring processes during 
economic downturns. Taken altogether, the characteristics of the construction industry need 
to be examined when attempting to understand trenching-safety behaviors.
Organizational factors are also recognized antecedents to safety performance. One 
commonly cited organizational factor is safety climate, which is defined as shared 
perceptions employees hold regarding safety (Neal & Griffin, 2004). These perceptions can 
be of organizational and management policies, practices, and procedures as well as the 
priority placed on safety compared to schedules and production (Zohar, 2003). Safety 
climate is commonly used as a temporary indicator or a ‘‘snapshot’’ of employee 
perceptions of risk and safety within an organization (Guldenmund, 2000).
The link between safety climate and safety-related outcomes has consistently been found 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). Meta-analyses have demonstrated that safety climate is related 
to safety performance as well as reductions in accidents and injuries (Christian et al., 2009; 
Clarke, 2006). Studies have also shown that a positive safety climate can be fostered through 
organizational changes. Zohar’s (2002) leadership intervention is a commonly cited example 
of how an organization can improve its safety climate. Zohar found that increasing the safety 
interactions between supervisors and workers led to improvements in safety climate as well 
as enhanced safety performance and decreased injuries. This intervention illustrates the 
important role management can play in promoting safety climate as well as workplace 
safety. Based on the safety climate research, it is suggested that unsafe trenching behaviors 
could be due to lack of perceived management support for working safely. For example, this 
work suggests that if workers perceive that properly installing trenching protective systems 
is not important to management then workers are likely to adopt unsafe behaviors.
The Current Study
Given the above findings on individual characteristics and the work environment, it appears 
necessary to consider additional elements beyond safety knowledge when attempting to 
identify barriers to safe behaviors. To gain a better understanding of factors contributing to 
current trenching practices, five focus groups with participants ranging from inexperienced 
apprentice carpenters to safety professionals were conducted. A qualitative approach has 
been adopted by other safety researchers to gain a better understanding of workers’ 
perceptions of safety. For example, Mullen (2004) identified social and organizational 
factors contributing to unsafe behaviors by interviewing workers from a variety of 
occupations. Gittleman et al. (2010) utilized a qualitative approach to identify additional 
safety issues not included in their needs assessment survey and to gain a deeper 
understanding of construction workers’ perspective of the safety of the work environment. 
Based on the prior qualitative research, it was decided that to truly understand the challenges 
to safe trenching practices, individuals involved in trenching needed to be enabled and 
encouraged to talk about these issues in their own words.
The qualitative data for this study comes from a larger evaluation project designed to 
examine the effectiveness of the NIOSH Trench Safely Awareness Training. This interactive 
computer-based training program was developed by NIOSH in 2005 and was designed to 
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increase awareness of excavation and trenching hazards and safe practices for construction 
workers, site supervisors and construction management. The themes that emerged from the 
focus groups were used to gain a better understanding of the current barriers to trenching 
practices and to provide recommendations regarding modifications that could be made to the 
current NIOSH Trench Safety Training program.
Methods
A total of forty workers from a Midwest construction trade association were recruited to 
participate in one of five focus groups. Both union and non-union workers were included in 
the focus groups. Participants generally were from medium to large contractors. While 
women were not intentionally excluded from the study the predominance of men in the 
construction industry resulted in only three women in the sample (two safety management 
personnel and one safety trainer).
Focus groups are interviews with groups of individuals conducted by a facilitator using a 
semi-structured question format (Fontana & Frey, 2000). The aim of conducting focus 
groups is to generate conversation among participants on specific topics of interest to the 
investigators. This study used focus groups to gain a broad understanding of perspectives 
and factors related to trench safety practices on specific topics (see goals 1 to 5 below). To 
meet this goal, individuals from various levels including apprentices, workers, safety 
trainers, and safety management personnel were divided into five groups. Due to logistical 
limitations, groups were not stratified by union membership or company size. Groups 1 and 
2 included construction workers who had between 1 to 20 years of experience working in 
trench excavation. Group 3 included carpenters’ apprentices who had minimal to no 
experience in trench excavation but possessed a strong likelihood of performing trench-
related activity during their careers. Group 4 consisted of safety trainers and consultants who 
were typically hired to train management and workers on trench safety practices and OSHA 
guidelines on trench excavation. Group 5 was composed of safety management personnel 
working for larger construction companies.
Each group, numbering eight participants, was shown the NIOSH Trenching Safety 
Awareness Training program and then participated in a guided focus group discussion. It 
should be noted that the qualitative methods used to analyze focus group data do not lend 
themselves to the same sort of power analyses used for quantitative research approaches. 
The concept of saturation is used to determine whether or not an adequate number of focus 
groups have been conducted (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Saturation is considered to have 
occurred when no new topics are generated by the groups. Based upon the researchers’ 
previous experience it was expected that saturation would be reached after conducting 4 to 5 
focus groups.
Conversation in each of the groups was started with a general question such as ‘‘What are 
some of the reasons trench safety equipment is not used when it should be?’’ Follow-up 
probes to these questions within each focus group discussion followed naturally from the 
answers received. Additional probes were tailored to draw out any unique perspectives from 
each group without sacrificing the goals of the analysis. For example, the group responsible 
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for operations management and decision-making was asked, ‘‘What are some of the costs 
associated with planning and acquiring trench protective equipment?’’ This item was not 
asked of the apprentice group. The following goals were addressed:
• Goal 1—Identify attitudes towards the trench safety awareness training program.
• Goal 2—Identify the perceived barriers to acquiring, assembling and implementing 
trench protective systems.
• Goal 3—Identify optimum sources of information to reach employers and workers 
and raise awareness about trench safety.
• Goal 4—Identify their current safety and health practices in their work 
environments.
• Goal 5—Determine their perceptions of current and previous experience with 
safety training, related to trench safety and/or other work practices.
Data Analysis
Following standard practice, qualitative data analysis of the focus group transcriptions took 
place in two stages: 1) independent coding, and 2) code consolidation (Ryan & Bernard, 
2000). Four researchers independently read the text and assigned labels to specific segments 
of the text that identified key categories and concepts related to the participants’ knowledge, 
attitudes and behaviors regarding trench safety. After each researcher completed open 
coding of the text, the second phase of analysis, code consolidation, began through a series 
of subsequent meetings to discuss unusual findings, identify divergences in opinion, and 
develop a consensus on common themes and the quotes related to these themes. Once 
consensus had been reached the coding schema was applied to the entire text by one of the 
members of the research team. Data management software (QSR NVIVO 8) was used to 
produce coding reports which were reviewed and analyzed by two members of the research 
team to develop a series of conclusions regarding information needs, motivational factors, 
and obstacles to safe practices reported in this manuscript. The researchers then reviewed 
the literature to identify possible models that could be used to contextualize the findings that 
emerged from the data. It was determined by the researchers that Neal and Griffin’s (2004) 
safety performance model provided a good framework to understand the data.
Results
Three major themes emerged from the analysis of the focus group commentary that 
contributes to an understanding of possible reasons for unsafe work practices: 1) perceived 
characteristics of the individual worker, 2) the relationships among experienced and 
inexperienced workers, and 3) the role of company hierarchy and management 
responsibilities. The themes of ‘‘perceived characteristics of the individual worker’’ and 
‘‘the role of company hierarchy’’ were further broken down into sub-themes which are 
described at the beginning of each section.
In general, the responses from workers (i.e., experienced workers and apprentices; Groups 1 
through 3) and responses from safety professionals (i.e., safety trainers/consultants and 
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safety management personnel; Groups 4 and 5) were similar. There were instances, 
particularly regarding the role of company hierarchy, when responses differed between the 
groups. In these instances the differences are explicitly mentioned below.
Perceived Characteristics of the Individual Worker
Characteristics of the individual worker that contribute to unsafe work practices were 
mentioned throughout all five of the focus groups. These comments concentrated on 
individual worker choices when implementing safety measures and could be grouped into 
three basic categories: 1) youth and inexperience, 2) knowledge of safety practices, and 3) 
experience.
Youth and Inexperience
Participants throughout the groups consistently brought up young age as a contributing 
factor to unsafe practices. Many participants believed that young, inexperienced people are 
generally less concerned about safety and more willing to take risks largely because they are 
less likely to foresee the potential consequences of a trench collapse or trench-related 
dangers. One trench worker commented:
‘‘Yeah, I agree with that. You think when you’re young that you’re going to live 
forever. Because I’m cocky. Because you get a young guy in off the street, and a lot 
of times he’s not experienced enough to know what could happen to him. Even 
watching the video, he doesn’t have the experience to know what could happen.’’
This attitude of indifference was seen as simply the general orientation of youth toward the 
world and highlights the need to tailor messages that alter these particular outcome 
expectancies. These comments further suggested a perception that younger workers with 
only a few years experience are more likely than older workers to perform risky behaviors.
Knowledge of Safety Practices
Although knowledge of safety practices was viewed as being related to youth or 
inexperience, many comments were geared more toward simple ignorance of the dangers of 
trenching in general or to specific regulations and safety practices. As one participant 
mentioned,
‘‘If I would have knew that (the dangers) back when I first got down in the ditch, I 
wouldn’t have got in there.’’
In another example a participant mentioned that workers he knew were unaware of the fact 
that there were situations in which a trench box would not provide adequate protection (e.g., 
when the box is smaller than the height of the excavation). In general, the participants 
stressed that a major barrier to safe trenching practices is simple ignorance of the dangers 
and the safety protection systems and that training addressing the lack of safety knowledge 
would be helpful.
Experience
While many participants mentioned experience contributed to safer work practices, 
numerous examples were also given throughout all the groups that suggested that experience 
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was often a hindrance to safety. A common explanation was that older workers developed 
unsafe practices before many trench safety regulations came into effect. Since these workers 
rarely encountered or perceived any negative consequences to these behaviors, such as 
physical injury or corrective action, they seemingly developed a false sense of security. As 
one participant put it,
‘‘I’ve done this a thousand times. It can’t happen to me.’’
In addition, one comment suggested that experienced workers are resistant to change 
because they see it as questioning their competence.
‘‘Being a young foreman . . . makes it hard on me . . . because they [experienced 
workers] say they did it for all these years, they don’t want to listen to that. What 
do you know? You’re young, you’re just getting into it!’’
Even though the respondent in this example was the foreman, he still found it difficult to get 
the more experienced workers he was supervising to follow the safety procedures. In 
general, the responses surrounding the topic of experienced workers suggested that 
experienced workers have a tendency to work unsafely since they prefer working their way 
instead of the safe and correct way.
Relationships between Experienced and Inexperienced Workers
In addition to the perceptions of the role of the individual worker to unsafe work practices, 
the relationships between the experienced and inexperienced workers were also mentioned 
as relating to the implementation of mandated safety practices. From the focus groups, it 
appears that many older, experienced workers seem not to respect current safety regulations 
and use tactics to prevent inexperienced workers from following these regulations. 
Inexperienced workers reported feeling pressured to not only conform to the unsafe 
practices modeled by older workers, but to continue the culture of working unsafely by 
harassing newer workers who try and do things by the book. The respondents also 
mentioned that there is an informal hierarchy among trenching workers and new workers 
have to ‘‘earn their acceptance.’’
It was commonly agreed among the worker groups that the older workers were key in setting 
the safety climate. Unfortunately, only one comment was made about an experienced worker 
encouraging safe practices.
‘‘This guy who is kind of a mentor to me will tell me, ‘That’s not the way that I do 
it, but a lot of things have happened in the last 30 years, and this is the way you 
probably need to do it if you don’t want to end up with asbestosis or silicosis and a 
lot of other things.’ Not very many of the old guys will do it. They want you to be a 
hard ass just like them.’’
In contrast, the other comments about experienced workers suggested that the experienced 
workers seemed to be the ones who encouraged acceptance of the dangers and risk taking. 
Participants, particularly the younger workers, reported that the experienced workers are 
often the ones that not only work in an unsafe manner but also have the informal and, at 
times, the formal authority to influence the way the others work as well.
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‘‘I mean, you got a lot of guys who did it before all the safety regulations came 
around, and they still kind of want to do things their way. A lot of times that’s your 
foreman or that’s your lead man and you kind of got to go with what he wants . . . 
you just think in your mind, ‘I’ve got to do it another way.’ But you can’t. If you 
say something, they view you as a bitcher and you don’t want to be labeled that.’’
This example suggests that the experienced workers have significant power in setting the 
cultural norms for the group. Based on the responses, workers who have been around several 
years tend to develop a feeling of expertise, which becomes part of their self-image. They 
perceive that their experience makes them ‘‘experts’’ and do not believe they need to learn 
new things. Participants also expressed that some of the experienced workers saw learning 
though trial, error, and injury as just part of the normal work experience; if the experienced 
workers learned in this manner, they saw no reason why new workers should have a 
different experience. This suggests some older workers view minor occupational injuries as 
rite of passage that can serve as an effective lesson in work hazards.
One common description of how experienced workers coerced inexperienced workers was 
to question their masculinity. In recounting experiences of being pressured by coworkers, 
terms such as ‘‘pup,’’ ‘‘pussy,’’ or ‘‘bitcher’’ were frequently used to refer to workers who 
expressed concerns about safety on the job. These comments suggest that the construct of 
masculinity is commonly used to enforce conformity to group norms and plays an important 
role in perpetuating the safety climate. Challenging worker masculinity was seen commonly 
among both experienced workers and supervisors in the workplace:
‘‘So he goes to the foreman and says, ‘‘Have we got any dust masks?’’ He’s like, 
‘‘Nope.’’ He said, ‘‘Well how ‘bout if I can get a dust mask?’’ His foreman looked 
at him and said, ‘‘Are you going to be a pussy your whole life, or are you going to 
be a man and get the job done?’’ That’s his exact words. His exact words. I mean, 
old guys, that’s what they do, and you just go around it, or you just join in with 
them and you do it too.’’
Participants mentioned a deeper concern that younger workers not only conform to but, over 
time, accept and perpetuate this unsafe culture.
Role of Company Hierarchy and Management Responsibilities
In addition to placing the blame for unsafe practices on the individual worker, both workers 
and safety professionals brought up problems with management. A common theme that ran 
through these comments was that it all came down to time and money and when there was a 
choice between meeting a deadline or doing it safely, safety almost always lost.
Participants cited that pressure to complete jobs quickly to meet a deadline is commonplace 
emanating from several sources. An example of management emphasizing performance over 
safety was demonstrated by many of the workers expressing fears that failing to meet 
deadlines could result in the loss of their job. Performance pressure also seems to manifest 
itself through status differences between workers and foremen, creating expectations that 
potentially interfere with safer behaviors,
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‘‘. . .everybody’s trying to be buddies with the foreman, or they might feel that 
pressure to perform, okay, maybe take that cowboy chance, because they feel better 
in the foreman’s eyes and they look better in the company’s eyes if they’re a 
productive employee. They get the job done no matter what it takes.’’
Participants agreed that getting management to value safety would drastically reduce trench 
fatalities. While there was agreement on this point, workers and safety professionals differed 
on what they saw as the main problems with management. Workers focused on the pressure 
they felt to work quickly versus safely which was often perceived as management’s lack of 
concern for workers’ well being. In contrast, safety professionals emphasized the 
organizational structures such as lack of communication between the front office and 
production teams that contributed to unsafe practices.
Worker Perspective on Management
As mentioned above, the workers tended to blame the company for the unsafe conditions. 
The workers also pointed out that safety trainings are limited in their effectiveness when up 
against the pressures of the workplace. Several comments made it clear that it was 
commonplace for workers to feel pressured to accept an unsafe situation or risk being fired. 
Of particular frustration to several of the participants was the inconsistency and mixed 
messages that workers felt they regularly received from the company.
‘‘Well every company you go to, if there’s a big push, if you got this amount of 
time to get it done and it’s close, you’re doing shit that’s shady. But then once it’s 
over, then they’ll be assholes about the safety. Then if you don’t get that damn yo-
yo on your back, you’re out of here for three days. Next time you’re fired. And 
that’s everywhere.’’
Safety Professionals Perspective on Management
Several unique themes emerged from the safety professionals (i.e., safety trainers/
consultants and safety management personnel). The safety professionals did agree with the 
workers that management’s ‘‘time is money’’ perspective played a major role in shaping 
unsafe work practices. Safety professionals’ perspectives, however, concentrated on how 
organization-level structures influenced both safety practices and worker motivation.
Construction sites were seen by safety professionals as constantly changing environments as 
subcontractors shift quickly among various sites on timetables that may not coordinate with 
the schedule of the general contractor management. Foremen and safety management often 
monitor multiple sites throughout the day, making it difficult to keep track of many of the 
potential hazards faced by subcontractors,
‘‘It happens before our trailer is ever out on the site. The hazards are there and gone 
before anybody’s had their supervisor at work because the site work’s going on.’’
The overall conditions contribute to the poor relationships between contractors and the 
subcontractors and demonstrate the need for improved communication. One safety trainer 
argued that better communication was necessary between workers, subcontractors and 
management to alleviate these problems.
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Safety managers with experience at larger companies emphasized that the lack of 
communication between the front office and the production folks resulted in poor planning 
on the jobsite. They discussed the difficulties of acquiring trench boxes on short notice 
either because they were not available or because of the time needed to transport them from 
one place to another. In other words, if the contractor fails to plan ahead, workers are simply 
held up waiting for equipment. This dead time increases the pressure to cut corners.
Improved communication, however, only addresses one of the themes brought up by the 
safety professionals. Participants also alluded to the need for incorporating better safety 
planning into business practices and for employers to look at safety as a financial 
investment. It was suggested that safety materials targeting employers incorporate 
information on OSHA penalties, fines, law suits and productivity losses.
General contractors typically request bids from a number of subcontractors and may not 
include their safety records as a selection criteria for economic reasons. Both small and 
large-size employers are faced with many economic choices when planning a project, 
forcing the safety directors to provide an effective return-on-investment strategy if they 
intend to leverage a change in the company’s culture. In essence, this lack of emphasis on 
safety from the start of the bidding process creates a culture that perpetuates financial 
incentive over safety. This attitude trickles down to other levels of management. Contractors 
may consider this risk as acceptable because, as one consultant stated,
‘‘. . .you sit there and weigh the odds, am I gonna get caught . . . roll the dice . . . 
am I gonna get in trouble for this . . . most of the time you win . . . 99% of the time 
you win.’’
This gamble creates unintended motivational consequences among competing 
subcontractors who actually try to practice safely,
‘‘I mean, you bid against the companies where you don’t get the job. You drive by 
the job and you see an open ditch ten feet deep with nothing in it. You sit there and 
it’s like, ‘How did they get away with that; as soon as we do something like that, 
OSHA’s on top of us and things like that.’’
While much discussion touched upon the motivational barriers within the construction 
culture, several participants talked about the need for more positive approaches to training 
and changing safety culture. The safety consultant group noted that management commonly 
criticized workers for inappropriate behavior but rarely praised safe behaviors. By focusing 
solely on criticizing unsafe behaviors, respondents were concerned that management 
effectively de-motivates a safe work-place rather than empowering workers to approach 
safety efficaciously.
Discussion
This study used a qualitative approach to better understand the current trenching practices 
and to identify possible barriers to safety behaviors in an effort to increase the effectiveness 
of safety trainings. The findings suggest that although knowledge is a key component to safe 
practices, other factors such as pressure from coworkers and employers also influence 
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behaviors. Therefore, to ensure workplace safety, additional factors beyond safety 
knowledge need to be considered. Identifying and addressing barriers to safe practices at the 
individual, group and organizational levels is essential in improving safety climate in an 
organization.
Participants in all of the focus groups tended to attribute risk taking behaviors to an under-
appreciation of the dangers of trenching. This is important because workers, who do not 
perceive their work to be dangerous, are less likely to be motivated to engage in safe 
practices. Multiple studies have shown that workers who are motivated to work safely tend 
to work more safely, which has then been linked to fewer accidents and injuries compared to 
workers who work unsafely (e.g., Christian et al., 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2004). Workers 
may understand superficially that the work is dangerous but may not understand how 
dangerous it is, or they may incorrectly believe they can avoid the dangers. Thus, training 
needs to address risk perceptions in addition to safety knowledge.
The findings also suggest that attitudes related to both inexperience (e.g., I’m invincible) 
and experience on the job (e.g., I know more than the ‘‘safety people’’) were seen as 
contributing to a diminished risk perception. Safety trainings should account for the range of 
factors that contribute to workers engaging in unsafe practices and encourage safety 
attitudes that influence workers to engage in safe practices (e.g., safety is everyone’s 
responsibility and I could hurt myself and others if I work unsafely). The finding that 
characteristics of experienced and inexperienced workers can contribute to a diminished risk 
perception suggests that messages targeting sub-populations of workers (i.e., inexperienced 
and experienced) may prove more effective than a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ model.
Although poor safety attitudes seem to be held by both inexperienced and experienced 
workers, special attention may need to be given to developing trainings for experienced 
workers. Experienced workers were perceived as being resistant to change in their safety 
behaviors since changes were seen as questioning their competence. Safety trainings 
targeted at experienced workers should focus on replacing unsafe behaviors with safe 
behaviors and re-training correct practices, but in a manner that reinforces their image as 
being knowledgeable and competent workers. Tailoring trainings in this manner may 
increase the likelihood that experienced workers take the trainings seriously and adopt the 
practices promoted in the trainings.
In addition to perceptions and behaviors at the individual level, group norms and the 
relationships between experienced and inexperienced workers were also found to be an 
important factor contributing to unsafe behaviors. Experienced workers were reported as 
successfully exerting their informal power to influence the behaviors of inexperienced 
workers. The participants mentioned that experienced workers have created a norm of 
working unsafely by harassing workers who follow safety guidelines. Because 
inexperienced workers are socialized to work unsafely, they are placed in vulnerable 
situations where even if they have the knowledge and motivation to work safely, they often 
cannot do so due to the pressure they face from the experienced workers.
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One common way experienced workers were reported as influencing inexperienced workers 
was to question their masculinity. Construction is a predominantly male profession and 
masculinity a core cultural value (Paap, 2006). Younger workers not only feel embarrassed 
when their masculinity is questioned in front of their peers but they also run the risk of 
losing their job and future employment if they develop a reputation as not being ‘‘man 
enough’’ to ‘‘get the job done.’’ When placed in the context of economic security, the 
association of male identity with risk taking behavior can be seen as a collective response to 
the pressure workers often feel, from their employer, to value production over safety. The 
internalization of this value often results in safety norms where workers put the interests of 
the company above their own safety and coerce fellow workers to do the same. Based on the 
focus groups, attacking inexperienced workers’ masculinity is effective since inexperienced 
workers reported engaging in unsafe, yet socially desired, behaviors often against their 
better judgment as a result of this coercion tactic. As Paap has pointed out, these norms can 
become internalized so that workers engage in unsafe behaviors when management is not 
present, or even when management is advocating for safe behavior as seen in the case of the 
young foreman above who reported older workers that he was supervising, resist his 
attempts to follow safety procedures. Over time, inexperienced workers not only conform to 
unsafe group norms but often reproduce them by harassing newer workers.
These findings suggest that the social environment needs to be addressed in safety trainings. 
Inexperienced workers are vulnerable to the challenges from experienced workers and 
therefore, need to be trained on how to recognize and address these challenges so they can 
work safely. Although inexperienced workers have little formal and informal power to 
control the working conditions, they are not helpless. They should be made aware of the 
dynamics common to the construction industry and be provided with tools so they can 
address common situations they are likely to experience. Experienced workers also need to 
better understand the importance of a positive safety climate and their role in promoting it. 
One suggestion is that experienced workers be placed in mentoring relationships with 
inexperienced workers. Leadership research has demonstrated that high quality leader-
subordinate relationships are related to workers putting in additional effort to ensure the 
workplace is safe (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003), safety communication, and safety 
commitment (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). The role of mentor would help reaffirm 
experienced workers’ knowledge and expertise. The mentoring role could also be easily 
framed as a traditional male role making it consistent with the overarching cultural value of 
masculinity. Based on leadership research and the focus group discussions, if experienced 
workers (i.e., the informal and/or formal leaders of construction sites) learned to actively 
promote safety and how to mentor inexperienced workers, the safety of worksites could be 
improved.
Group norms do not develop in a vacuum and it was widely recognized in all the groups that 
company management played a central role in influencing the value placed on safety. While 
it was generally acknowledged by participants that small companies more frequently 
engaged in unsafe behavior relative to larger ones, it was also noted that pressure to engage 
in unsafe behavior was commonplace throughout the industry and in companies of all sizes. 
In some companies, instances of disregard for safety regulations or their inconsistent 
FLYNN and SAMPSON Page 13













application led many respondents in the worker groups to perceive management as being 
more concerned with production than safety. Encouraging workers to ignore safety 
regulations in order to finish on or ahead of schedule suggests management is willing to 
gamble with the safety of their workers and possible OSHA fines when there are financial 
incentives that accompany meeting a deadline. Likewise, enforcing safety procedures during 
slow production periods suggests the financial incentive of avoiding potential OSHA fines 
or workers’ compensation claims since there is less financial motivation to finish the job 
quickly. Either way inconsistent enforcement of safety regulations sends a message to 
workers that safety is a financial calculation. Over time, it is easy to see how workers could 
develop a cynical attitude toward company efforts to promote safety and internalize the 
value of production over protection in an effort to remain employed.
In contrast, the safety professionals perceived lack of communication and planning and poor 
safety attitude as the main problems with management. This group pointed out that it is not 
necessarily lack of concern by management but instead lack of communication and planning 
that forces workers to work unsafely. Industry-wide practices such as competitive bidding 
were also mentioned as contributing to poor planning and communication. It was 
emphasized that the economic value of safety needs to be made explicit and that 
management needs to consistently reward employees for working safely.
The two viewpoints regarding management’s contribution to unsafe practices provides 
insight into elements that need to be included in safety trainings. Similar to the suggestion 
that trainings need to include ways to deal with the pressure inexperienced workers feel 
from experienced workers, safety trainings also need to address the reality of working 
conditions and provide suggestions on how workers can deal with the pressure they will 
receive from management to work in an unsafe manner. It is suggested that, in addition to 
training workers, a management intervention involving all levels of management from low-
level supervisors to top management is greatly needed since all levels have power and 
influence over workplace safety. Prior safety climate research has demonstrated the 
important influence of management demonstrating a commitment to safety on workers’ 
perceptions of the value of safety as well as safety outcomes (Zohar, 2002). If management 
does not value safety, this is going to trickle down to the workers and influence their safety 
attitudes and behaviors. To foster positive safety attitudes among the workers, management 
needs to adopt a more positive view of safety. As mentioned above, Zohar’s supervisor 
intervention is one way to improve safety climate as well increase positive safety behaviors 
and reduce accidents.
Implications
Hard and Soft Skills—An implication of our findings is the importance of including both 
hard (i.e., technical knowledge) and soft (i.e., dealing with people) skills into safety 
trainings. From the focus group discussions and prior research, safety knowledge should 
continue to be a main element in safety trainings. However, for workers to actually be able 
to use this safety knowledge, soft skills also need to be taught. One important soft skill 
identified from the focus group discussions is how to communicate about safety with 
experienced co-workers and management (e.g., supervisors and top-management). There has 
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been some research on upward safety communication, which is the freedom workers feel to 
discuss safety issues with their foremen/supervisor (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Research 
has demonstrated that construction safety is enhanced with safety communication 
(Cigularov, Chen, & Rosecrance, 2010). It is important to incorporate safety communication 
training in future safety trainings. Future research should investigate the best methods to 
teach safety communication skills to each level of an organization, from workers to top 
management. Future research could also explore other soft skills that would increase the 
effectiveness of safety trainings such as behaviors associated with emotional intelligence.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approach—Another implication of the findings is the 
importance of taking both a top-down and bottom-up approach. The focus group data clearly 
demonstrated that the social environment greatly influences workers’ safety behaviors. 
Training needs to be targeted at workers so they learn how to engage in the proper safety 
behaviors, learn to value safety, resist social pressure to engage in unsafe acts, and how to 
communicate safety issues with their coworkers and management. A top-down approach is 
also needed since management needs to adopt the value of safety and pass this value on to 
their workers. Most of the communication research has focused on top-down 
communication (Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Hershcovis, & Stride, 2008) such as targeting 
supervisors to communicate the importance of safety to workers in an effort to change the 
workers’ behavior (Zohar, 2002). More research needs to focus on the importance of the 
influence of experienced workers since the focus group discussions suggest experienced 
workers greatly influence inexperienced workers behaviors. Additionally, there is a need for 
unique messages and training strategies to be developed for inexperienced and experienced 
workers as well as different levels of management.
Limitations
Despite the strengths and contributions of the study, the results and interpretations require a 
discussion of the possible limitations that should be addressed by future research. First, our 
research results may not be generalizable due to the relatively small sample size of primarily 
male workers from mostly medium to large construction contractors. Another possible 
limitation of the study was company background or union identification were not considered 
when making the focus group assignments. It is possible that union and non-union workers 
hold different opinions regarding safe practices. Additionally, workers from small 
companies could view safety differently than workers from large organizations. Therefore, 
larger sample sizes with workers from more varied backgrounds should be recruited in order 
to clarify any differences in option between various groups.
Conclusions
Overall, the results suggest that safety trainings need to address real-life situations that 
construction workers face on a daily basis that impact their ability to work safely. The study 
demonstrates the need to look beyond safety knowledge to individual, group, and 
organizational dynamics when developing safety trainings. Specifically, at the individual 
level future safety trainings should address risk perceptions and safety attitudes, since both 
appear to contribute to workers engaging in unsafe practices. Safety trainings need to also 
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address the social environment present on the worksite by highlighting common group 
dynamics among coworkers (e.g., unsafe social norms, or experienced workers discouraging 
safe practices) and providing workers with tools to manage these situations. Trainings 
should account for the various levels in the workforce and include tailored safety messages 
to different sub-groups such as inexperienced workers, experienced workers, and managers. 
Safety trainings should also acknowledge and help workers identify and address 
organizational and industry factors that can contribute to unsafe practices and norms of 
behavior among individuals and groups of workers. Trainings should provide workers, as 
individuals and as a group, with tools (e.g., how to respond collectively to an unsafe request 
from a supervisor) to address real life organizational barriers to safety common in the 
industry (e.g., pressure from supervisor to work faster at the expense of safety). Overall, 
these recommendations point to the need for safety professionals to understand their 
audiences and the barriers to safety prior to the development of training materials. Further 
research into understanding these barriers and finding effective ways to address them is 
warranted. In conclusion, the findings suggest that providing workers with effective tools 
(i.e., ‘‘soft skills’’) to address individual, group and organizational barriers they are likely to 
encounter would enhance their ability to implement the safety procedures that are currently 
taught (i.e., ‘‘hard skills’’).
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